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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
The sole issue presented in this appeal is the difficult 
question of who must bear the burden of persuasion when 
a criminal defendant raises a justification defense to the 
federal charge of being a felon in possession of afirearm in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. S 922(g)(1) (1994). We specifically 
reserved this question in United States v. Paolello, 951 F.2d 
537 (3d Cir. 1991), in which we defined the elements of the 
justification defense to S 922(g)(1). See Paolello, 951 F.2d at 
544. We now conclude that, in a case such as this one, 
given the nature of the justification defense and of the 
crime charged, the defendant must prove the elements of 
this affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. 
We will therefore affirm the District Court's order of 
conviction and sentence. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
Reginald Dodd was convicted by a jury in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania of one count of being a felon in possession of 
a firearm. During the trial, Dodd stipulated to his status as 
a convicted felon and did not dispute that he had possessed 
a firearm for a short period of time on December 3, 1996. 
The only question at trial was whether Dodd was justified 
in possessing the gun for the purpose of preventing harm 
to others. The justification defense in our court has four 
elements: (1) that the defendant or someone else was under 
unlawful and present threat of death or serious bodily 
injury; (2) that the defendant did not recklessly place 
himself in a situation where he would be forced to engage 
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in criminal conduct; (3) that the defendant had no 
reasonable legal alternative that would avoid both the 
criminal conduct and the threatened death or injury; and 
(4) that there was a direct causal relationship between the 
criminal act and the avoidance of the threatened harm. See 
Paolello, 951 F.2d at 540-41. 
 
Dodd and two other eyewitnesses, his neighbors Hazel 
Flood and Cynthia Reed, testified in Dodd's defense. Dodd 
and Flood testified that they had spotted a gun lying in the 
street, and that Dodd had picked it up in order to keep it 
out of the hands of a group of young children who were 
coming down the street. Dodd testified that he took the gun 
in order to prevent the children from hurting themselves. 
After Dodd picked up the gun, he put it in his pocket and 
walked back toward his nearby home; Dodd testified that 
his "intention[ ] was to pick this gun up and take it to the 
house and call the police and report it." A. at 157. Before 
Dodd could reach his house, two plainclothes police 
officers, who were responding to a radio call, 1 stopped and 
frisked him, finding the .25 caliber automatic pistol. 
 
At trial, much of the testimony concerned the issue 
underlying the third element of the justification defense: 
whether Dodd had a reasonable legal alternative to picking 
up the gun. Flood, who discovered the gun initially, testified 
that she was unwilling to pick up the gun herself. Dodd 
and Flood both testified that they saw no alternative to 
Dodd's picking up the gun in order to prevent the 
approaching children from getting their hands on it. The 
government, whose witnesses included the arresting 
Philadelphia police officers, Todd Lewis and Kevin Lewis, 
argued that Dodd could have pursued other courses of 
action, such as asking Flood or Reed to call the police while 
Dodd stood over the gun to prevent the children from 
taking it, covering the gun to hide it, or kicking the gun 
down the nearby sewer. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. This call described a robbery suspect with a physical description 
resembling Dodd's. The government was not able to produce evidence 
linking the robbery with Dodd, or showing that he was the suspect 
described in the radio call. 
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During the jury charge conference, defense counsel 
argued that the defendant should bear only the initial 
burden of production on the justification defense, while the 
government should bear the ultimate burden of persuasion. 
According to the defense's theory, Dodd need only present 
some evidence to support each element of the defense; 
should he do so, the government would then bear the 
burden of disproving at least one element of the defense 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The government argued that 
where the justification defense did not negate one of the 
elements of the crime charged, the defendant should be 
required to prove each element of the defense by a 
preponderance of the evidence. The District Court 
concluded that the government had correctly described the 
placement of the burden of persuasion; the District Court 
relied principally on the reasoning of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. 
Dominguez-Mestas. See United States v. Dominguez-Mestas, 
929 F.2d 1379, 1380 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (holding 
that the defendant bears the burden of proving a duress 
defense to a federal charge of unlawful importation of 
narcotics). The District Court, therefore, gave a jury charge 
that placed the burden of persuasion on the affirmative 
defense of justification on the defendant, by a 
preponderance of the evidence. The Court included an 
explicit description of the burden of persuasion: 
 
       [A]s to this defense the burden of proof is upon, not the 
       Government, but upon the defendant to prove by a fair 
       preponderance of the evidence, that is to say, to prove 
       the defense, factually and legally, more likely than not, 
       has been made out. Burden of proof by a 
       preponderance of the evidence is more likely than not. 
 
A. at 257. In her closing argument, government counsel 
specifically referred to "the defendant's burden to show you 
there was nothing else that he could have done." A. at 239. 
 
During its deliberations, the jury clearly was grappling 
with the issues raised by the justification defense. On the 
first day of deliberations, the jury asked Judge Gawthrop: 
"Do we have to consider [Dodd's] perception of legal 
alternatives?" A. at 266. The jury also requested a 
handwritten copy of Judge Gawthrop's instructions on the 
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justification defense. See A. at 271, 273-74. The jury 
returned a guilty verdict on the second day of deliberations. 
 
At sentencing, the District Court granted an unopposed 
downward departure motion based on overrepresentation of 
criminal history, and imposed a sentence of 15 years' 
imprisonment, the mandatory minimum sentence provided 
by the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. S 924(e)(1). 
Dodd now appeals his conviction and sentence. 
 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this federal 
criminal case pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3231. We have 
appellate jurisdiction over the District Court'sfinal decision 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We review de novo the 
District Court's legal determination as to the appropriate 
placement of the burden of persuasion. See Walden v. 
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997) ("We 
generally review jury instructions for abuse of discretion, 
but our review is plenary when the question is whether the 
instruction misstates the law."). 
 
III. Discussion 
 
The question of the appropriate placement of the burden 
of persuasion can be broken down into two subsidiary 
questions: (1) Can this court constitutionally place the 
burden of persuasion on the defendant? (2) If we can place 
the burden of persuasion on the defendant, should we? 
 
The first question is easily answered in the affirmative. 
Although the Due Process Clause requires the government 
to prove all elements of the charged offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt, see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 
(1970), and therefore requires the government to disprove 
beyond a reasonable doubt any defenses that negate an 
element of the charged offense, see Patterson v. New York, 
432 U.S. 197, 210, 215 (1977), there is no constitutional 
bar to the defendant's bearing the burden of persuasion on 
defenses that do not negate an element of the offense, see 
Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210-11. To show that Dodd was a 
felon in possession of a firearm in violation ofS 922(g)(1), 
the government was required to prove the following 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that Dodd had 
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previously been convicted of a crime punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; (2) that Dodd 
knowingly possessed a firearm; and (3) that thefirearm had 
passed in interstate commerce. The factual basis for Dodd's 
justification defense, if accepted, would not serve to negate 
any of these elements. The requirement that the 
government must show that the defendant "knowingly 
possessed a firearm" means only that the government must 
prove the defendant's awareness that he possessed the 
firearm; the government need not demonstrate that the 
defendant possessed the firearm with an intent to cause 
harm, or with knowledge that such possession was 
unlawful. Thus, the justification defense would not negate 
the mens rea element of the felon-in-possession statute. 
See Paolello, 951 F.2d at 544 ("[T]he fact that a person acts 
for an innocent reason in no way detracts from the knowing 
quality of his act."). 
 
Dodd essentially concedes that placing the burden of 
persuasion on him is not constitutionally prohibited. 
However, he urges us to follow United States v. Talbott, 78 
F.3d 1183 (7th Cir. 1996) (per curiam), in which the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined 
that, absent a statute explicitly allocating to the defendant 
the burden of proving an affirmative defense, a court has 
no power to allocate this burden to the defendant: 
 
       Nevertheless, the fact that the Constitution allows 
       Congress or state legislatures to enact laws allocating 
       to criminal defendants the burden of proving 
       affirmative defenses does not mean that, absent a 
       statute actually doing so, the burden shifts 
       automatically. In other words, though it may be 
       constitutionally permissible to enact a burden-shifting 
       statute, some affirmative legislative action must trigger 
       that shift. Absent such a statute, the burden of proof 
       remains on the government to negate beyond a 
       reasonable doubt the affirmative defense properly 
       raised by the defendant. 
 
Talbott, 78 F.3d at 1186 (citation omitted). The Talbott 
Court therefore held, in a case involving a justification 
defense to a felon-in-possession charge, that the burden of 
persuasion must remain with the government because 
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Congress has not allocated the burden to the defendant by 
statute. We do not find Talbott's reasoning persuasive. 
Talbott cites to cases that either refer to such statutory 
burden-shifting in permissive terms, employ statutorily 
created placement of the burden of persuasion on the 
defense, or allocate the burden of persuasion to the 
government as a matter of federal constitutional or common 
law for reasons other than the absence of statutory 
allocation. Unlike the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 
however, we can find nothing in this case precedent that 
limits such burden allocation to occur only if Congress has 
explicitly ordained it. The felon-in-possession statute does 
not contain any mention of a burden of proof on a 
justification defense, or indeed, of the defense itself. Rather, 
it states simply that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person -- 
(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime 
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; 
. . . [to] possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm." 18 
U.S.C. S 922(g). The justification defense, at least as it 
relates to this charge, is a judge-made defense. See Paolello, 
951 F.2d at 540-41 (outlining the elements of the 
justification defense as it applies to the felon-in-possession 
charge). Where courts have engrafted a traditional common- 
law defense onto a statute that itself is silent as to the 
applicability of traditional defenses, it is within the province 
of the courts to determine where the burden of proof on 
that defense is most appropriately placed. See United States 
v. Masters, 978 F.2d 281, 287 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 
We therefore have the capacity to place the burden of 
persuasion on either party, despite the lack of explicit 
statutory allocation of the burden of proof. The more 
difficult question is where we should place the burden of 
persuasion regarding this defense to this offense. 
 
This is a question of federal common law. In searching 
for potential sources of the answer to this question, we first 
look to Supreme Court case law and that of our own Court. 
We find no Supreme Court case that clearly speaks to this 
question; the Supreme Court case law is more frequently 
directed at the problem of constitutional constraints on the 
placement of the burden of persuasion, not at the question 
of where the burden is best placed when the Constitution 
does not constrain the choice. 
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Three opinions of our Court of Appeals, however, bear 
some relevance to the issue of the placement of the burden 
of persuasion on the justification defense to aS 922(g) 
charge. Paolello contains language hinting that, under the 
circumstances presented by the strictly worded felon-in- 
possession statute, it may well be the defendant who bears 
the burden of persuasion on the justification defense: "To 
ensure that this strict prohibition [of felons in possession of 
firearms] is effectuated, we should require that the 
defendant meet a high level of proof to establish the defense 
of justification." Paolello, 951 F.2d at 542. However, it is 
quite clear that this language is dictum, because we 
explicitly reserved the question of the allocation of the 
burden of proof: 
 
       At oral argument before us the parties agreed that if 
       there were a new trial it would be Paolello's burden to 
       produce evidence to support the justification defense 
       and, if he did so, it would be the government's burden 
       to disprove that defense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
       We think, however, that inasmuch as there may be 
       some question as to whether this agreement accurately 
       reflects the law and, in view of the further fact that the 
       briefs understandably do not focus on the issue, that 
       it would be prudent to leave for determination on the 
       remand the allocation of burdens on the justification 
       defense. 
 
Id. at 544.2 Thus, Paolello does not settle the question 
before us. 
 
The two other cases, United States v. Santos, 932 F.2d 
244 (3d Cir. 1991), and United States v. Smith , 949 F.2d 
677 (3d Cir. 1991), both decided before Paolello , do not 
present the specific circumstance of the burden of 
persuasion on a justification defense to a S 922(g) charge, 
but discuss more generally the appropriate placement of 
the burden of persuasion for affirmative defenses that do 
not negate an element of the crime charged. In Santos, we 
reviewed under a plain error standard a jury instruction 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Although we stated that the issue should be left "for determination on 
the remand," no such determination actually ensued; instead, when the 
case was remanded, Paolello entered a guilty plea. 
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regarding the burden of persuasion on a duress defense to 
cocaine distribution and conspiracy charges. See Santos, 
932 F.2d at 245, 250. We found no plain error in an 
instruction that put an initial burden of persuasion on the 
defendant to prove the duress defense by a preponderance 
of the evidence; were the defendant to make this initial 
showing, the burden would then shift to the government to 
disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 
248. Santos herself had requested this instruction; her 
objection to the charge on appeal was not that the burden 
of persuasion was misplaced, but rather that the trial judge 
did not sufficiently explain the meaning of the 
"preponderance of the evidence" standard to the jury. While 
the government correctly states, and the District Court also 
found, that Santos enshrines into the law of our court the 
principle that "there is no constitutional bar to placing the 
burden upon a defendant to prove the affirmative defense of 
duress by a preponderance of the evidence where the crime 
charged contains no requirement of mens rea," id. at 249, 
it is clear that Santos does not itself announce a general 
rule for the appropriate placement of the burden of 
persuasion in such cases. Unlike the case before us, Santos 
involved a highly deferential standard of review of a jury 
charge that was in essence requested by the defendant. We 
conclude that Santos, like Paolello, leaves the question 
before us unanswered. 
 
Although Smith presents circumstances much different 
from those before us, it contains some discussion of the 
Santos decision that is worth noting here. In Smith, we held 
that, under Virgin Islands law, it was plain error for the 
District Court to refuse to give an instruction on the burden 
of proof on self-defense; the charges were first degree 
murder and unlawful possession of a firearm during the 
commission of a crime of violence. See Smith, 949 F.2d at 
678-79. Smith speaks broadly of the government's burden 
to disprove affirmative defenses, but Smith  does not directly 
address our situation: Smith dealt with a state law case in 
which the defense in question negated the requisite intent 
element. The Smith majority, in distinguishing Santos, does 
state that the jury instruction in Santos, although 
"erroneous," did "correctly place[ ] upon the government the 
ultimate burden of proving duress beyond a reasonable 
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doubt." Smith, 949 F.2d at 682 n.5. In fact, even the Smith 
dissent refers to the charge given in Santos as being 
erroneous, though not plainly erroneous. See Smith, 949 
F.2d at 688 (Alito, J., dissenting). However, the Smith 
panel's characterization of the Santos decision is dictum, 
and, as we have noted earlier, Paolello, decided after Smith, 
clearly did not regard the question of the appropriate 
burden of proof on affirmative defenses as a settled 
question. To the extent that dicta are relevant to our 
decision in this case, the dicta in Paolello and in Smith 
might be said to point in opposite directions. 
 
We conclude that Paolello, Santos, and Smith do not 
answer the question before us. We therefore proceed to 
consider the case law of other Courts of Appeals as a guide 
to how we might choose the appropriate rule in this case. 
 
Although the parties in our case propose different 
characterizations of the appellate case law on the issue 
before us (and indeed the parties differ as to how they 
characterize the issue itself), they agree that the other 
Courts of Appeals are not in complete accord on this topic. 
See Dodd Br. at 12 ("The vast majority of the circuits have 
held that, absent congressional legislation to the contrary, 
the government bears the burden of disproving an 
affirmative defense, such as justification or duress, so long 
as the defendant has produced some evidence in support of 
the defense."); Gov't Br. at 19 ("All but one of the circuits 
that have specifically addressed the issue have held that, in 
the context of crimes that do not require specific intent or 
mens rea, the burden of proof as to justification is properly 
placed upon the defendant."). In reflecting on the case law, 
we keep in mind that the only issue before us today is the 
proper placement of the burden of persuasion on the 
justification defense to a felon-in-possession charge, not the 
more general question of the placement of the burden of 
persuasion on affirmative defenses that do not negate an 
element of the offense. 
 
Two Courts of Appeals have addressed the precise issue 
before us, and have reached opposite conclusions. We have 
already described the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' 
decision in United States v. Talbott, which rested on the 
assumption that Congress's silence as to the burden of 
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persuasion on this defense left the courts powerless to 
place the burden on the defendant. As stated above, we 
disagree with Talbott's analysis. As we noted above, 
Congress was silent not only on the issue of the burden of 
persuasion, but also as to whether the defense itself was 
available. Just as we have the power to read the traditional 
common-law defense into the statute, we have the power to 
determine the applicable burden of persuasion. Talbott also 
relied upon the existence in its court of a pattern jury 
instruction on point, which placed the default burden of 
persuasion on the government to disprove affirmative 
defenses beyond a reasonable doubt; we have no such 
pattern jury instruction in the Third Circuit.3 Because the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' analysis rested almost 
entirely on its conclusion that the court was without power 
to place the burden of persuasion on the government, and 
on the further support of the Seventh Circuit pattern jury 
instructions, we decline to follow the Talbott  decision. 
 
We view the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals as having 
adopted a sounder approach. In United States v. Deleveaux, 
205 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2000), the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the defendant in 
a S 922(g) case bears the burden of proving a justification 
defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The Deleveaux 
Court emphasized that in the context of a felon-in- 
possession charge, the justification defense depends on 
"additional facts and circumstances that are distinct from 
the offense conduct." Deleveaux, 205 F.3d at 1299. The 
Deleveaux Court further explained: 
 
       [T]he justification defense is a limited defense to a 
       strict liability statute,4 which sought broadly to prohibit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Just as the case law in this area is divided as to the appropriate 
placement of the burden of persuasion, so are the pattern jury 
instructions of those courts that have promulgated such instructions. 
See infra note 8. 
4. The case law in our court describes the S 922(g) offense as a "general 
intent" crime rather than a strict liability crime, United States v. 
Williams, 892 F.2d 296, 303 (3d Cir. 1989), superseded by statute on 
other grounds as indicated in Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 39 
n.1 (1993). However, the general intent contained in the S 922(g) offense 
is merely the baseline intent to possess the firearm; thus, the 
distinction 
between our nomenclature and that of the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals does not obviate the applicability of the reasoning of the 
Deleveaux Court. 
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       possession of firearms by convicted felons. The 
       justification defense also does not negate any element 
       of this offense, but requires proof of additional facts 
       and circumstances distinct from the evidence relating 
       to the underlying offense. . . . The defendant will 
       usually be best-situated to produce evidence relating to 
       each element of this affirmative defense. 
 
Id. at 1300. 
 
The reasoning in Deleveaux dovetails nicely with the case 
law already existing in our court, most notably Paolello. 
While Paolello did not speak to the precise issue before us 
today, in that case we did clearly indicate that we should 
adopt a narrow view of the justification defense as 
employed in connection with the felon-in-possession 
statute. See Paolello, 951 F.2d at 541, 542 (noting that 
"several courts have limited the breadth of the justification 
defense . . . in the section 922 context in order to achieve 
the statute's purposes," and approving this "restrictive 
approach"). Deleveaux relies on Paolello for this principle, 
see Deleveaux, 205 F.3d at 1297 (quoting Paolello, 951 F.2d 
at 541-42), and, although Paolello does not control the 
outcome in this case, our imposition of the burden of 
persuasion on the defendant would be entirely consistent 
with our reasoning there. 
 
We find Deleveaux to be persuasive and consistent with 
the background of the common law.5 At common law, the 
defendant bore the burden of proving all affirmative 
defenses. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. at 202 (1977) 
(stating that at common law, the burden of proving 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We also note the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit in United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1991). 
In Wolak, the Court of Appeals did not explicitly announce a rule as to 
the appropriate placement of the burden of persuasion on a "temporary 
innocent possession" defense to a S 922(g)(1) charge, but did express its 
view that an instruction proffered by the defendant"was fatally flawed 
because it erroneously stated that `the Government must prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that this defense [innocent possession] does not 
apply to this case.' " Wolak, 923 F.2d at 1198. The innocent possession 
defense at issue in Wolak was characterized by the Wolak Court as a 
"justification defense" and is similar to the defense at issue here. Id. 
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"affirmative defenses -- indeed, `all . . . circumstances of 
justification, excuse or alleviation' -- rested on the 
defendant") (quoting 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries 
*201); see also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 693 
(1975). Although there has been something of a twentieth- 
century trend toward requiring the government to bear the 
burden of persuasion on certain affirmative defenses, this 
trend has been by no means uniform across jurisdictions or 
across types of defenses. See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 207 
n.10 ("Even so, the trend over the years appears to have 
been to require the prosecution to disprove affirmative 
defenses beyond a reasonable doubt. The split among the 
various jurisdictions varies for any given defense.") 
(citations omitted); George P. Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal 
Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion 
Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 Yale L.J. 880, 887 (1968); 
see also Jay M. Zitter, Construction and Application of 18 
U.S.C.A. S 17, Providing for Insanity Defense in Federal 
Criminal Prosecutions, 118 A.L.R. Fed. 265, 265 (1994) 
(describing how public outcry following John Hinckley's 
attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan led to 
Congress's enactment of the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2057 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. S 17(b) (2000)) (shifting to the 
defendant "the burden of proving the defense of insanity by 
clear and convincing evidence")). An examination of 
appellate decisions concerning the burden of persuasion on 
other affirmative defenses reveals a quite divided 
jurisprudence, without any clear default rule as to how 
affirmative defenses generally should be treated. For 
example, in the case of duress or coercion defenses, 
appellate courts have set differing rules for allocating the 
burden of persuasion in various circumstances.6 Compare, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We include a description of these duress and coercion cases merely as 
an example of the variety with which courts have treated the burden of 
persuasion on common-law affirmative defenses. We do not believe that 
the duress and coercion cases are sufficiently similar to the 
justification 
scenario so as to be dispositive of this case, even were these duress and 
coercion cases to be uniform in their allocation of the burden of 
persuasion. Cf. Paul H. Robinson, 1 Criminal Law Defenses S 25(b), at 96 
(1984) (placing duress and coercion in the "excuse" category of defenses, 
a broad category separate from the "justification" category). For the 
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e.g., United States v. Willis, 38 F.3d 170, 179 (5th Cir. 
1994) (stating, in a case involving a duress defense to a 
charge of carrying a firearm during the commission of a 
drug trafficking crime, that the defendant bears the burden 
of proof of "a justification defense such as duress"), and 
United States v. Dominguez-Mestas, 929 F.2d 1379, 1380 
(9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (holding that defendant has the 
burden of proving duress defense to a charge of unlawful 
importation of merchandise),7with United States v. Arthurs, 
73 F.3d 444, 448 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating that, in a case 
involving charges of importing cocaine and possessing 
cocaine with the intent to distribute it, the government 
must disprove a duress defense beyond a reasonable doubt 
once the defendant has laid "a predicate warranting a 
duress instruction"), United States v. Mitchell, 725 F.2d 
832, 836 (2d Cir. 1983) (placing burden of persuasion on 
government to disprove duress defense to armed bank 
robbery charges, once the defendant has sufficiently placed 
the defense in issue), and United States v. Campbell, 609 
F.2d 922, 925 (8th Cir. 1979) (holding, in bank robbery and 
escape case, that, once the accused has placed before the 
court "facts giving rise to a coercion defense," the 
government "must rebut the issues of coercion beyond a 
reasonable doubt").8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
reasons described above, our own holding in this case is limited to the 
circumstances presented here -- the justification defense to a felon-in- 
possession charge -- and therefore we consider only the case law on that 
issue (Paolello, Talbott, Delevea 
              ux, and Wolak) to be directly relevant to 
our decision. 
 
7. The District Court in the case before us, which rendered its decision 
in April 1999 and thus did not have the benefit of the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals' subsequent decision in Deleveaux, relied heavily on the 
reasoning of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Dominguez-Mestas. 
See A. at 215-18. Although Dominguez-Mestas  has some persuasive 
force, we find Deleveaux, which more clearly matches the scenario at 
issue in our case, to be the better guide to our decision. 
 
8. The pattern jury instructions cited by both the government and the 
defendant similarly reflect the absence of a clear default rule on the 
placement of the burden of persuasion on affirmative defenses generally. 
See Federal Judicial Center Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions S 56 
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At oral argument, Dodd's counsel suggested that we 
should follow the same analytical course in allocating the 
burden of persuasion for the justification defense to the 
S 922(g) charge as we have for entrapment. We have held, 
as has the Supreme Court, that the government bears the 
burden of disproving both elements of an entrapment 
defense (government inducement of a crime and lack of 
predisposition on the part of the defendant). See Jacobson 
v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548-49 (1992); United States 
v. Wright, 921 F.2d 42, 44 (3d Cir. 1990). In light of the 
diversity of analytical solutions that the appellate courts 
have reached with respect to various affirmative defenses, 
however, we reject any argument that consistency demands 
we follow the entrapment precedents in this case. 
Entrapment is a very different defense from the justification 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
(1988) (placing burden of disproving duress defense on government); 
First Circuit Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, intro. cmt. (1998) 
(stating that, except in the case of the insanity defense, the burden of 
persuasion on affirmative defenses is on the government); id. S 5.05 
(stating that government bears burden of disproving duress defense, but 
also referring to a case note that says "the burden of proof remains with 
the government, at least if the charged crime requires mens rea") 
(emphasis added); Fifth Circuit Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions S 1.36 
(1997) (placing burden of persuasion on defendant on justification, 
coercion and duress defenses, but noting that this practice is "[c]ontrary 
to many other circuits"); Sixth Circuit Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions 
S 6.05 (1991) (placing burden on the government on coercion and duress 
defenses, but noting that "significant modifications must be made in this 
instruction" in the case of a justification defense to a felon-in-
possession 
charge); Seventh Circuit Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions S 4.01 (1999) 
(stating that, for affirmative defenses other than insanity defense, 
burden 
of persuasion is on government); Eighth Circuit Model Criminal Jury 
Instructions S 3.09 (1996) (similar to Seventh Circuit); Ninth Circuit 
Model Criminal Jury Instructions S 6.4.2 (1997) (placing burden of 
persuasion on defendant for affirmative defenses that do not negate an 
element of the offense). We note that the relevant Eleventh Circuit 
pattern instruction, Eleventh Circuit Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions 
S 15 (1997), which appears to place the burden of persuasion on the 
government, contains language suggesting that such placement is only 
appropriate in cases where the offense has a high mens rea requirement; 
furthermore, it seems clear that Deleveaux at least partially supersedes 
this pattern jury instruction. 
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defense in the instant case; in order to raise the defense of 
entrapment, there must be some evidence that government 
agents have had an inappropriate role in bringing about the 
criminal behavior alleged. It seems reasonable that the 
government should bear the burden of disproving a defense 
whose very essence is the allegation of illegitimate 
government conduct. See Sherman v. United States , 356 
U.S. 369, 372 (1958) ("Entrapment occurs only when the 
criminal conduct was `the product of the creative activity' of 
law-enforcement officials.") (quoting Sorrells v. United 
States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932)). In contrast, the 
justification defense to a felon-in-possession charge 
concerns an exception to a very restrictive statute that, on 
its face, forbids possession in all circumstances; the facts 
necessary to allege and to prove a justification defense in 
this scenario are more easily accessible to the defendant 
than to the government. See Deleveaux, 205 F.3d at 1300 
("[T]here are strong practical considerations in favor of 
requiring the defendant rather than the government to bear 
the burden of proving the justification defense to a 
S 922(g)(1) charge. . . . The defendant will usually be best- 
situated to produce evidence relating to each element of 
this affirmative defense."). 
 
We conclude that a rule that places the burden of 
persuasion on the defendant with regard to a justification 
defense to a felon-in-possession charge is constitutionally 
permissible, consonant with the common law, preferable for 
practical reasons, and faithful to the strictness of the 
statute into which we have read this justification defense.9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We reject Dodd's argument that putting the burden of proof on the 
defendant on an affirmative defense will unduly confuse the jury. The 
cases cited by Dodd in support of this argument, see Dodd Br. at 21-24, 
are not on point. United States v. Mitchell, 725 F.2d 832, 836 (2d Cir. 
1983), concerned a defense that tended to negate the mens rea element 
of the charged crime. United States v. Watson , 489 F.2d 504, 510-11 (3d 
Cir. 1973), referred to jury instructions that placed the burden of 
persuasion on one element of a defense on the government, and on 
another element on the defendant. While such bifurcated jury 
instructions might be confusing, the simpler instruction at issue here 
would not be. In this particular case, Judge Gawthrop gave a jury 
instruction that clearly placed the burden of persuasion on the 
defendant on his justification defense. See supra page 4. 
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We will therefore AFFIRM the District Court's order of 
conviction and sentence. 
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